有媒體或名嘴說當今敘利亞局勢是伊斯蘭與世俗的阿薩德政權的對抗，未來若阿薩德倒台，敘利亞將成為一個伊斯蘭式的國家，實行伊斯蘭律法，進而威脅周邊區域的安全。
這種分析多半來自美國學術圈的國際關係架構。國際關係通常從結構與大的框架下分析，優點是可以讓不清楚敘利亞局勢的讀者，從大國政治的角度，很快掌握敘利亞情況。但是這種分析對於敘利亞內部複雜的情況卻無法知悉，且忽略敘利亞內部本身對敘利亞局勢的發展影響，而ㄧ再強調大國政治的競逐。從國際關係角度中，這種分析無法區別敘利亞境內的伊斯蘭團體不同之處，或是誤認將伊斯蘭力量視為抗爭初期的主要因素。（如埃及的革命，部份媒體也是有這種錯誤認知。）
下面ㄧ篇長文，是ㄧ位過去在敘利亞進行深度訪問與研究的學者。他指出敘利亞境內的伊斯蘭團體，大致可以分成三個類型：
1. 沈默的新基本教義派 (Acquiescent
neo-fundamentalist)：持續強調道德教化，並支持阿薩德政府。
2. 反政府的伊斯蘭團體：又可以分為兩類
(1) 拒絕使用暴力抵抗政府。表示在現有政治架構下，應透過漸進式的政治自由化與民主化，改革敘利亞。
(2) 支持革命，認為阿薩德倒台後，將可以改變敘利亞。（屬於少數）
3. 對於現在敘利亞政治不表示意見，仍強調個人宗教功修。
該文是在今年二月時候發表。那時作者分析敘利亞約80%的宗教學者與其支持群眾，對於敘利亞局勢保持沈默，多數未投入反抗陣營。但才短短幾個月的時間，敘利亞中部發生數起大屠殺事件，叛逃的政府官員與將軍數量增加，全國各地動蕩不安，連過去相對穩定的首都大馬士革與第二大城阿勒坡都出現自殺炸彈與槍戰的消息，現今敘利亞已經陷入內戰局勢，似乎沈默的多數開始沸騰。但因該作者沒有更新敘利亞伊斯蘭團體們的近況，因此尚未得知，是否過去保持沈默的多數宗教學者已經改變以往立場？
Feb 21 2012
In one of his
recent papers, Steven
Heydemann
writes that the attempts of forces behind the Syrian uprising and the Syrian
National Council (SNC) to define themselves as the pre-eminent nationalist
force in the country risk backfiring. This is because they face a regime that
has successfully justified its rule by constantly emphasizing its own pan-Arab
and nationalist credentials. Effectively, therefore, these self-identifications
stir up precisely the old political sympathies and fears that have propped up
the Syrian regime for decades. This jousting over who will be the champion of
the Syrian nation is taking place within a context where identity politics have
been forcefully asserted in the country. Their emergence has, in turn, prompted
fears of civil war between the different factions and concerns that Islamist
extremists will treat the uprising as an opportunity to grab the reins of
power. The
Syrian regime is stoking these fears through the official media. The regime claims that a large
part of the dissenting movement is Islamist-driven—that is, driven by Islamic
political forces that aim to capture the state (some democratically and others not)
and to achieve an Islamic way of life from above (some democratically and
others not). The
Assad regime also claims that the movement has exclusively pro-Sunni
aspirations,
that many of the demonstrators are affiliated with dormant Salafi radicals and
Islamist terrorist groups, and that a number of attacks and attempts to smuggle
weapons have already been thwarted.
These
claims by the regime are not new. Indeed, Syrians have been hearing about the
threat of Islamists since the 1970s. Though these warnings faded in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s due to a manufactured détente with acquiescent prominent
Syrian shaykhs, they have tended to re-emerge at every critical juncture
faced by the regime. For instance, tensions with the United States in the
aftermath of the latter’s 2003 intervention in Iraq and following the
assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Harriri in 2005 both prompted
the Syrian Command to claim that the United States was plotting to destabilize
Syria by arming a number of what were then newly-emerging radical Islamists
such as Jund al-Sham and Ghuraba’ al-Sham. And as recently as 9 November 2011,
Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem stated in a letter sent to the United
Nations and the Arab League that the United States is funding and enabling
Islamist terrorists within Syria.
It is clear that
Syria has witnessed an Islamic
revival in
the last twenty-five years or so, largely the result of a state-Islamist
relationship
concocted by the regime to ensure its resilience and considerable control over
Syria’s Islamist groups. Ironically, this has also created conditions within which Islamic
movements have been able to increasingly mobilize and recruit new members. As a result, Syria is
witnessing an increase in overt public religiosity though not necessarily in
religiosity more generally. It is also clear that Islamic radicalization took place in the
aftermath of the war in Iraq. But to allege that it is radical militant
Islamists, funded by foreign powers, who are driving today’s protests is a
stretch of the imagination. Yet, for many Syrians who have been subject to state propaganda
about the Islamist threat for years, the line between fantasy and reality is
often not so clear. Moreover, recent events, such as the 2011 Tunisian and
Egyptian elections in which Islamist political parties won some forty to sixty
percent of parliamentary seats, have only added to their concerns.
These popular
fears have prompted the SNC to directly address the issue of the possible rise
of an Islamist group to power, by asserting its principled commitment to
secularism and pluralism. Noteworthy here is the striking similarity between
the statements of the SNC and those of the regime regarding the “Islamist
threat”. Both have implicitly characterized Islamic groups as a monolithic
group of “Islamists”, with similar origins, aspirations, tactics, beliefs, and
reactions to the rebellion that is taking place. In fact, however, the country’s Islamic
tapestry is complex. It includes numerous factions with different interests and
allegiances, including some that are not necessarily anti-regime (or at least
that have not yet publically expressed an anti-regime stance), and others that
are loyal regime partners.
In light of this
current context, as well as the fears, misconceptions, and mischaracterizations
that prevail within it, it is important to examine Syria’s Islamic sector more
closely. Is the
driving force behind the popular protests an Islamic one? What is the likelihood of
Islamists rising to power if the regime is ousted? Which Islamists might do so?
Who are Syria’s Islamists, meaning those Islamic groups working towards
Islamist-driven political action (or the aspiration to make the move towards
such action)? Finally, are Islamists leading change in Syria, as the Syrian regime
and its supporters allege?
Who Are
Syria’s “Islamists”?
Syria’s
Islamic movement is both dynamic and diverse. It includes numerous actors that do
not see eye to eye on many issues. More particularly, Islamic groups in Syria do not share a
unified agenda or set of goals, and they have differing relationships to the
state.
Ultimately then, they are as divided and as diverse as their secular
counterparts. Islamic
reaction to the Assad regime’s violent repression of the recent rebellion
underlines this diversity. While some Islamist groups have remained staunchly pro-regime,
some have clearly expressed their opposition to the regime’s actions., and yet
others have yet to take a formal position.
We can divide Syria’s Islamic groups into three main categories based on their reaction to
latest events in the country: (1) acquiescent neo-fundamentalists who continue to prioritize ethics over
political activism, continue to support the regime, and defend the regime
publically; (2) anti-regime
Islamic groups
who, in turn, can be subdivided into two groups: one of which expresses a desire for gradual
political liberalization and democratization within the confines of the current
power structure and which categorically rejects the use of violence, and another subgroup consisting of anti-regime
Islamists who believe that only the collapse of the Assad regime can bring
about change and thus support a revolution from above; (3) Islamic groups who remain politically
quiet, choosing to focus on individual ethicality rather than politics.
Acquiescent Groups
Acquiescent
Islamic groups are pro-regime and neo-fundamentalists. Neo-fundamentalists can
and might develop political aims in the longer run, but are immediately
concerned with the
“re-Islamization” of society and the establishment of a Muslim ethos. They have for the most part
achieved disproportionate strength and status during the Ba’athist era due to
the close client-patron relationships that their shaykhs have forged with the
authoritarian regime. These relationships have benefitted both the co-opted shaykhs,
as well as a political elite looking to appease Syria’s religious groups.
In this case, those being appeased by the political elite were and continue to
mostly be the Sunni religious class, although the appeasement formula was
applied to all religious denominations.
As
part of their commitment to the Assad regime, co-opted ‘ulama agreed to promote an
Islam that accommodated the existing authorities and that accepted their right
to wield power.
And as noted above, this type of Islamic movement advocates the Islamization of society
from below. It thus focuses on the ethical transformation of individuals rather
than the broader politico-economic implications of Islamic teachings that had traditionally been
emphasized by Syria’s Islamic shaykhs. This led the regime to relax its
controls over these groups, which in turn allowed them to achieve greater
prominence in Damascus, Aleppo, and Lattakia. They also became increasingly
institutionalized and attracted a large membership, mainly urban middle class
constituents who tend to be more at ease with the large size and the anonymity
of these groups than their rural counterparts.
The category of
“acquiescent Islamic groups” thus includes the majority of Syria’s “official” ‘ulama,
such as Mustafa Kamel, the Mufti of Idleb, Shaykh Muhammad ´Abd al-Satar
al-Sayed (Minister of al-Awqaf), as well as Syria’s Grand Mufti Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun. The latter’s son, Sariya
Hassoun, was shot dead by unknown assailants on 3 October 2011. Hassoun has confirmed the
regime’s account about the “looming Islamist threat” by blaming the death of
his son on radical Islamists whose religious pronouncements have, he claims,
justified the killing of innocent civilians. He also used the occasion of his
son’s funeral to express his utter rejection of what he calls the “foreign
plot” behind anti-regime forces. He further insists that the Syrian nation will
not give in to this international pressure and that Syrians will maintain their
nationalist support for the regime rather than succumbing to cowardice.
Another
pro-regime acquiescent group is the Naqshbandi Kuftariya movement. It is probably Syria’s largest and
most powerful Islamic group. Despite some internal divisions, it has remained
overall loyal to the incumbent regime. Represented by prominent shaykhs
such as Shaykh Muhammad Wahba, Shaykh Rajab Deeb Shaykh [http://www.sheikhrajab.org], Salah Kuftaro, and Dr.
Muhammad Habash, this Islamist movement initially supported and justified the
regime’s overall vision and actions. Yet it is increasingly avoiding making any
public statements concerning unfolding events.
Significantly,
Shaykh Habash has recently criticized some aspects of the regime’s dealings
with the uprising. For
instance, he has accused the Syrian media of acting as a tool of the state by
presenting only half-truths and neglecting protestor perspectives. Due to his liberal Islamic
pronouncements and interpretations, as well as his history of justifying the
regime, many still see Habash as a spokesperson for the regime. However, he has
attempted to position himself as a neutral witness able to see both sides’
legitimate views. This is made plain by his mubadarat al-tareeq al-thaleth
li-inqaz Suriya (the third path initiative to save Syria), which asserts
and promotes the regime’s legitimacy by suggesting that the “traditional
opposition” and the regime should work together to solve the impasse.
Another
prominent and even more staunchly pro-regime Islamic group is the Middle Path
movement led by Shaykh Sa´id Ramadan al-Buti. Al-Buti has acted as the regime’s
Islamic spokesperson par excellence since the 1970s. From the very beginning of
the present uprising, he has cautioned Syrians against following ahl
al-jahala (the people of ignorance), which is an Islamic term that refers
to those who ignore the truth of Islam, warning them that doing so could lead
to factionalism and civil war since violence can be the only result of defying
the country’s political rulers.
In regards to
the present revolt, these acquiescent shaykhs support the regime claim
of a foreign plot against Syria (fitna min
al-kharej tuhak did Suriya) that aims to incite violence and
terrorize the Syrian nation. They argue that foreign, alongside ill-advised
domestic forces, are justifying the killing of the innocent and targeting the
Syrian people’s unity and proud political culture of resistance. In so doing,
these forces are allegedly undermining national resistance to outside
interference, weakening Syria’s strong support for the Palestinian cause, and
enabling US and Zionist plots against Arabs. These shaykhs have also expressed
their dismay at a number of anti-regime Islamists, claiming that their fatwa
have legitimized the killing of thousands of Syrians at the hands of terrorists.
Anti-Regime
Islamic Groups
The Gradualists
This subgroup of
anti-regime Islamic groups is made up of second generation, regime co-opted and
usually politically quietist neo-fundamentalists who have worked with or at
least agreed to work from within the framework set in place by the
authoritarian regime. They have, in the last few years, developed effective
outreach methods and capacities that allow them to circumvent the state’s
mechanisms of control, though they have not so far demonstrated the will to use
them. These
neo-fundamentalists have recently shed their apolitical stance and have
expressed their opposition to the political command’s repressive actions
against the protestors.
This
group includes such mildly oppositional Aleppine shaykhs as Nur al-Din
´Itr and the Mufti of Aleppo Mahmud ´Akkam, as well as the more aggressively
oppositional Shaykh Ibrahim al-Salqini. Ibrahim al-Salqini, who was appointed in 2005 as the
Grand Mufti of Aleppo in yet another regime attempt to co-opt the religious constituency
in that city. Salqini died on 6 August 2011 of a heart attack. After his death,
protestors labeled him a martyr of the uprising. This was due to
Salqini’s refusal to be part of the circle of shaykhs who continued to
support the regime, and as a result of his May 2011 refute of the official
claim that Aleppo’s apparent calm reflected support for the regime.
Other dissenting
shaykhs within this sub-group include Damascenes such as Mu‘az al-Khatib
(who was briefly arrested in May 2011, allegedly for criticizing the regime),
Muhammad Krayyim Rajeh (shaykh al-Qura’ or the shaykh of Quran reciters), the al-Rifa‘i brothers (Sariya and
Usama), and the pacifist and incorruptible Shaykh Jawdat Sa´id. These shaykhs have expressed their
concerns regarding the latest events and have signed a number of petitions in
which they insist on the cessation of all violence and on the need for the regime
to undertake significant political reform. According to dissenting ‘ulama
who want the Assad regime to fall, such as Shaykh ´Abd al-Karim Bakkar, some of
these shaykhs are naïve to think that the Syrian people can achieve
their demands without incurring human and material losses.
The gradualist
subgroup of the Islamic opposition has expressed a milder form of criticism of
the regime and has refrained from publicly supporting the present uprising. Some argue that its
leadership has done so out of fear that their involvement might contribute to
further fomenting divisions and unrest within Syrian society, and thus hasten
the possibility of civil war. Nonetheless, it seems certain that its members
would play a role within the Syrian political arena, if and when the regime is
finally ousted.
The Anti-Regime Islamists
This subgroup of
anti-regime Islamists support regime change and is made up of forcibly
exiled and traditional political opponents of the Ba‘ath Party, including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). It also includes smaller
groups who were for the most part politically quiet and da‘wa
(proselytizing)-oriented, at least until the outbreak of the current uprising. The majority of these smaller
subgroups tend to be relatively peripheral, with members from a poorer and
often rural background or from the smaller cities. Moreover their members’ piety is an
extension of their sense of religious commitment rather than a specific
commitment to the Islamist movement. In other words, a majority of the members do not have a
particular political reading of Islam and are not militant themselves despite
supporting these Islamist groups.
In
addition to the Brotherhood, anti-regime Islamists include Syrian Salafis who
number a few thousand and are represented by Lu’ay al-Zu‘bi and the al-Mu’minun
Yusharikun movement (Believers Join In). They also include a few prominent Sufi groups who recently met in
Istanbul and are led by the prominent shaykh of Damascus’ Umayyad
Mosque, Shaykh Muhammad Ya´qubi, as well as a group of prominent ‘ulama,
led by Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim Bakkar, who also met in Istanbul in July 2011 to
discuss the Syrian uprising and the role that they could play in supporting it.
Anti-regime Islamist further include the Islamic Kurdish opposition in Syria
led by Shaykh Husseyn ‘Abd al-Hadi, as well as Rabitat al-‘Ulama al-Suriyeen,
which is a faction within al-Itihad al-‘Alami li-‘Ulama’ al-Muslimin (the
International Union of Islamic Scholars founded by Yusuf al-Qadawi six years
ago) led by the Aleppine shaykh Dr. Muhammad ‘Ali al-Sabuni and the
Hourani shaykh Dr. Ibrahim al-Hariri.
These various
Islamist opposition groups all met in Istanbul in mid-October 2011, as part of
an attempt to unite the Syrian Islamic opposition, to organize efforts in
support of the Syrian revolt and SNC, and to begin planning for a post-Asad Syria. They have, in general, advanced a
political discourse that is pluralistic, civil, and democratically-oriented (or
post-Islamist). They
claim to chart a middle path on the political spectrum and insist on the need
for a modern and “civic” state. Although the different shaykhs have diverging opinions
on whether they should become militant or not, most assert that Islamic groups should
continue focusing on da‘wa and civil activism. Most have publically side-stepped the
question of whether the state should be Islamic or not. Importantly, while these anti-regime
groups appear to be quite numerous because of their relatively high visibility,
Islamic websites and Islamic leaders assert that they represent a relatively
small percentage of Syria’s total ‘ulama (some say less than twenty
percent).
Still another
set of anti-regime groups—though one that is even more radical—consists of
Islamists who were recruited in Syria and sent over to Iraq following the most
recent American intervention in the latter country. The set includes groups
such as Ghuraba’
al-Sham, as
well as Syrian and non-Syrian dormant Salafi jihadists inspired by or
affiliated with al-Qaeda (for instance, Jund al-Sham and al-Tala’i´a
al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila). While these various subgroups are most certainly
radically anti-regime— indeed, they see the Syrian command as heretical and so
would not hesitate to intervene if given a chance—their political discourse
prioritizes dealing with the “foreign enemy” first and foremost over dealing
with the “domestic front”. It is important to underline that these militant
Islamists remain a miniscule minority in Syria, and their impact can be
considered minimal, at best.
The Political
Quietists
While a small
number of Syria’s ‘ulama and Muslim Brothers have supported the call for
political change in Syria, the country’s Islamic leaders (and one might argue a majority of
their followers) have, in general, not initiated or contributed to the present uprising. They have also refrained from expressing
any opinion on the latest political events and have remained silent on the
regime’s actions.
According to dissenting shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim Bakkar, at least eighty percent of
Syria’s ‘ulama, and arguably their followers, are
part of this quietist group.
Thus, the greater part of Syria’s
Islamic groups have remained politically quiet, continuing to tread the same
path that they first started upon in order to survive under the country’s
authoritarian political establishment. More particularly, these quietist shaykhs—who
include the vast majority of shaykhs and Islamic groups in Syria’s
largest cities of Damascus, Aleppo and Lattakia—continue to pursue their
apolitical brand of Islamic conversion, which focuses on spiritual regeneration
and individual ethicality rather than the explicitly political.
Some of the politically quietist
groups have remained silent because they accept the regime’s arguments that the
uprising is part of a foreign-directed scheme to divide and rule Syria, or that
civil war might break out if the regime collapses. Some see working within the current
authoritarian context as a blessing in disguise for practicing Muslims, since
the regime has ensured that other (read: secular) competing ideological
alternatives cannot flourish. And still others have remained silent out of fear of
the regime’s retribution, a fear that is certainly informed by Hafez al-Assad’s
brutal repression of the Islamist uprising in the 1980s.
Conclusion
While a large
number of Islamic groups in Syria have refrained from commenting on the
uprising, some prominent shaykhs (mainly from Damascus) have continued to lend
their full support to the Syrian regime and to bestow upon it a much-needed
aura of legitimacy. At the same time, a small number of prominent ‘ulama have
timidly expressed the need to use peaceful and pacifist methods to bring about
change. They believe that gradual reform is better than shock therapy. And
still another small
minority has publically and directly called for an end to the regime, and has
taken an active part in the popular uprising.
Having said this, it
is important to note that pious Muslims do seem to constitute a majority of the
protestors.
This has to do with the gradual demise of Syria’s secular heritage over the
last 30 years or so, mainly due to the stifling authoritarian context within
which secular intellectuals have had to operate alongside a simultaneously
powerful, well-organized religious revival. Yet, Syria’s opposition protestors are not
in the main “Islamists”, and so are not necessarily interested in imposing an
Islamic way of life from above. Just
as important, protests have not been initiated, organized or supported by the
country’s mosques, shar‘ia schools, or pious institutions. Indeed, as we have seen, shaykhs
and ‘ulama have largely remained on the sidelines until very recently
when a number of shaykhs have become more active, publically
joining protestors. And while this latter point does not obviate the
possibility that an Islamic group or coalition could take over in Syria once
the regime is eventually ousted, it does help us to dispel myths about the leadership role
played by the Islamists in the uprising.
A
possible additional question arising from the previous paragraph concerns why would
protestors often gather in and around mosques if Syria’s Islamists are not
behind the uprising? This question can be answered by reference to the
emergency law banning the right to assembly, which was in effect until very
recently. Because of the ban, mosques were and are the only legal spaces for
assembling and organizing. Moreover, in a political context where society is
both pulling and being pulled apart, mosques can be places for bringing society
back together again, and thus for helping to cope with wrenching divisions. And
because large numbers of people frequent mosques, protestors can be assured of
greater anonymity and a larger presence, thereby minimizing their chances of
persecution by the regime’s forces. Finally, because of their central place in
the community, mosques help to infuse individuals with a sense of belonging to
a powerful and united community that can resist the regime.
This brief
overview has underlined the variety of actors within Syria’s Islamic sector,
particularly in terms of their beliefs, goals, and actions within the present
context of the country’s unique uprising. Such a nuanced account allows for a more
thorough understanding of present and possible future roles for Islamists in
Syria. Such an account is necessary to
overcome the tendency to homogenize Islamic groups and to take recourse in
vague, frequently misleading generalizations based upon propaganda, fears, and
a simple lack of knowledge.
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